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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the short-term effects of both product and labour market reforms on 
employment growth. Using Portuguese firm-level data, covering the period 2006-2015, we 
show that product market deregulation brings employment gains. Concerning the labour 
market, while expenditure in active labour market policies and reductions of the tax wedge are 
also associated with positive employment developments, reforms targeted at lowering 
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The literature concerning the long-term effects of product and labour market structural 
reforms on macroeconomic outcomes is very rich, mainly due to the annual reports made by 
supranational institutions such as the OECD, the IMF and the European Commission, usually 
relying on aggregate data and cross-country analysis.  
In recent years, short-term effects have gained weight in the literature, given their relevance 
for the political economy of the reform process. Understanding short-term dynamics is crucial 
for policy makers to design the optimal reform package, both in terms of sequencing and 
bundling of reforms. Additional, short-term effects are also key for the ownership of the 
reforms and for overall support. This is particularly true for employment, given that voters 
usually do not support reforms which cause significant job destruction (even if only in the 
short-term), thus penalizing the incumbent government (Buti et al., 2010).  In the case of the 
reform process recently implemented in Portugal during the Economic Adjustment 
Programme in 2011-2014, the European Commission highlights the relevance of political 
economy considerations, underlining that “partners had to strike a difficult balance between 
pushing for more reforms and avoiding risks a political crisis in the government coalition or 
of breaking the social consensus” (European Commission, 2016). Indeed, Portugal is an 
interesting case study for reforms’ impact assessment, as it implemented a comprehensive and 
broad-based reform agenda during the past decade, with important reforms inter alia in the 
areas of product and labour markets.  
A number of studies focus on the productivity effects of these reforms (see Gouveia, Santos 
and Gonçalves, 2017 or Monteiro, Gouveia and Santos, 2017). Thereby, the aim of this paper 
is to provide a closer look at the impact of the reforms on employment outcomes of 
Portuguese firms, since it complements past research at national level. Using a firm-level 
dataset covering all Portuguese firms for the period 2006-2015, we estimate a first-difference 
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model of employment growth with contemporaneous and lagged effects of the different 
reforms. We are thus able to compute impulse-response functions for the effects of the 
reforms one and two years after implementation. Our results show that product market 
deregulation, reductions of the tax wedge and increased spending in active labour market 
policies (ALMP) all bring employment gains, at least in the short-term. On the contrary, the 
effects of labour market deregulation are associated with short-term employment costs.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the 
main reforms recently implemented; Section 3 summarizes the relevant literature concerning 
the effects of reforms on employment outcomes; Section 4 presents the methodology; Section 
5 provides a detailed description of the data, and Section 6 presents the empirical findings and 
the robustness analysis. Finally, Section 7 concludes and presents avenues for further 
research. 
 
2. A Bird’s Eye View on Recent Reforms 
This section provides an overview of the recent product and labor market reforms 
implemented in Portugal, to shed light on the type of changes that are being assessed. We 
focus on four main areas: product market regulation, the strictness of the employment 
protection legislation, the magnitude of the tax wedge (i.e. ratio of labour taxation to total 
labour cost for the employer) and the so-called active labour market policies such as short-
term training programs to improve the skills of labour supply, hiring subsidies for the 
unemployed in order to increase labour demand or investment to improve job matching. The 
choice of these reform areas follows three criteria: effective implementation of the reform in 
Portugal during recent years, variability of the available reform indicator and lack of single 




Product market deregulation, mainly in upstream sectors such as networks, begun even before 
the Economic Adjustment Programme and was key to improve the business environment. 
Liberalizing energy markets, like electricity and gas, controlled by their main incumbents 
(EDP and GALP) was an important step to put an end to entry barriers and further 
accumulation of excessive rents. Some adopted policies include reduce compensation for 
early termination of long-term purchase agreements, phasing out regulated tariffs and increase 
efforts to integrate Portuguese and Spanish energy markets. Changes in the transport sectors 
were also made, since competition in railways and ports was low. Despite delays, some loss-
making railway lines were closed, CP Carga privatization started, the gradual elimination of 
port user fees helped exporting firms, and both TAP and the airport infrastructures’ manager 
(ANA) were privatized in order to improve efficiency in aviation sector. Regarding the 
telecommunications and postal sectors, many changes were made to strengthen the power of 
the regulator and to lower entry barriers, particularly through the abolishment of State’s 
privileged position and its golden shares in Portugal Telecom (PT), the entry into force of a 
new regulatory framework concerning telecommunications and the privatization of the 
national postal service (CTT), among others.  
In recent years, there were also important reforms of employment protection, namely with 
reduced severance payments for fair dismissals of permanent employees (from the formerly 
30 days per year worked down to 20 days, and later on 12 days) and the introduction of 
additional criteria to dismiss workers when a work position is extinct, relaxing the 
employment protection legislation. Labour taxation was also subject to important changes in 
recent years, with an increase of income taxation and higher social security contributions paid 
by employees and employers; which implied a significant tax wedge increase. Concerning 
ALMP, public spending has started to increase again in 2012, after a large drop in 2009. In 
recent years, changes were made to improve the quality of these policies, namely by 
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modernizing Public Employment Services to better match jobseekers with employers or 
temporary work agencies (see OECD, 2017 for more information).  
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1 Product Market Reforms 
Product Market Regulation  
Empirical research using aggregate or industry-level (cross-country) data shows that pro-
competitive reforms have a positive impact on employment outcomes in the long-run, often 
with short-term costs (see, for instance, IMF, 2016 and Cacciatore and Fiori, 2016 for studies 
using aggregate data; and OECD, 2016 using industry-level data). 
Firm-level studies provide evidence of positive effects of product market deregulation on 
employment already in the short-term (see, e.g., Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002, for France; 
Viviano, 2008, for Italy, and Gal and Hijzen, 2016, for a cross-country analysis). Yet, some 
authors find short-term direct costs from deregulation in network industries, mainly due to re-
organization and downsizing, allowing a cost reduction to deter the entry of competitors 
(Bassanini, 2015). 
 
3.2 Labor Market Reforms 
Employment Protection Legislation  
Empirical findings suggest a positive impact on net employment from an EPL reduction (see, 
e.g., Kugler et al., 2003 for Spain, Autor et al., 2006 for the U.S., and  Martins, 2009, 
evaluating the short-term impact of a reform introduced in Portugal, and Micco and Pagés, 
2006, who use cross-country industry-level data). However, some firm-level studies show that 
reforms introducing less stringent legislation have, in the short-run, an immediate effect on 
dismissals with a milder effect on hirings (Messina and Vallanti, 2007). Thus, it results on a 
non-positive impact in the firm’s short-term net employment, as obtained by Von Below and 
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Thoursie (2010), using an employer-employee linked panel dataset for Sweden. Also, Boeri 
and Jimeno (2005), relying on individual data for Italy, find evidence that permanent 
employees in firms with better firing practices have higher probabilities of being dismissed. 
 
Tax Wedge 
In general, cross-county studies show that reducing the labour tax wedge increases 
employment rates in the long-term (e.g. Bouis and Duval, 2011 using industry-level data; 
Nickell, 2003, Bouis et al., 2012 and IMF, 2016 using aggregate data). Equivalently, 
Bassanini and Duval (2006) show that, for the “average” OECD country, higher tax wedges 
are associated with increased unemployment. Interestingly, some authors show that the 
magnitude of those effects depends on institutional features, such as the skill level of the labor 
force (Gorá et al., 2006), or unemployment benefits and minimum wages (Nickell, 2003; 
Kugler and Kugler, 2008). 
 
Active Labor Market Policies 
The literature suggests a positive relationship between public-sponsored training programs 
and employment rates in the long-term (Boone and van Ours, 2004 using cross-country 
aggregate data; Lechner et al., 2004 and Fitzenberger and Speckesser, 2005 both relying on 
micro-level, administrative data for Germany). In the short-term, evidence also points to 
positive employment effects (e.g. Lechner et al., 2004 highlight the effects of training). In 
Portugal, a recent paper by Martins and Pessoa e Costa (2014) shows that jobseekers 
receiving unemployment benefits who participate in job centre meetings, which include 







The empirical strategy for assessing the impact of structural reforms on employment is based 
on Bassanini (2015) and OECD (2016), which uses a first-difference model for 
contemporaneous and lagged effects. We also use Teulings and Zubanov (2014) local 
projections estimators to obtain impulse-response functions that allow for the identification of 
the reforms’ impact in different time horizons (y). 
4.1. Baseline Regression for Short-Term Analysis 
We implement a specification that estimates the effect of the reform up to Y years after its 
implementation relying on a system of simultaneous equations with leads (f) and lags (k):  
ΔEmploymenti,t+y = ∑ β
𝑦
𝑓=1 fy ΔReformt+f + ∑ β
𝑛
𝑘=0 ky ΔReformt-k + ∑ β
𝑛
𝑘=1 ky ΔEmploymenti,t-k +      
ϒ1Xit + ϒ2Dj + ϒ3Dg + ϒ4Dt + Ɛit                [1] 
For y ∈ (0, Y) and where ΔEmploymenti,t+y is the first difference of the logarithm of 
employment in firm i at time t+y (i.e. y years after the reform), ΔReformt+f  is the change in 
the reform indicator f years after t (with f ≤ y), and ΔReformt-k is the change in the reform 
indicator k years before t. The k years lag is also used to account for past employment changes 
(ΔEmploymenti,t-k) in order to mitigate serial correlation issues. Xit are controls for firm-level 
observables, and Dj, Dg and Dt are, respectively, dummies to control for unobserved industry-
specific effects, geographic location fixed-effects and time macroeconomic developments that 
are common across firms. Standard errors are robust and clustered by industry to account for 
heteroscedasticity. 




The cumulated response (CR) at y periods after the reform implementation is computed by 
summing the estimated coefficients of the first-differences, following OECD (2016):  
CR (y) = ∑ β𝑌𝑦=0 0y 
The contemporaneous effect (y = 0) is only used for the case of indirect effects of regulation, 
i.e. for the effect of changes in upstream regulation on downstream sectors, where omitted 
variable bias and reverse-causality is less of a concern. For the other reforms, we start at y = 1 
precisely to avoid these issues. Unobserved, time-invariant, firm heterogeneity is eliminated 
by first-differences. 
Moreover, in order to have a view beyond the impact of reforms on the average firm, we 
weigh the regressions with each firm’s average number of workers. Thus, our regressions give 
more relevance to firms for whom a given increase in employment is more important for the 
economy.   
 
4.2. Baseline Regression for the Difference-in-Differences Estimation 
We also present causal evidence of some specific reforms’ impact with Difference-in-
Differences (DiD) specifications of the form: 
Employmentit = β0Ti + β1Pt + β2 Ti . Pt + ϒ1Xit + ϒ2Dg + Ɛit               [2] 
where Employmentit is number of workers in firm i at time t, Xit are controls for observables, 
and Dg are again geographic fixed-effects. Ti is an indicator variable for the treatment group, 
and Pt indicates the after-reform period. In our DiD estimations fixed-effects (FE) are used 







5.1. Firm-level Database 
We use firm-level data from the Informação Empresarial Simplificada database (IES), 
provided by Banco de Portugal. The dataset covers the entire population of firms in Portugal 
and includes annual information on their balance sheets, profit and loss statements and staff 
establishments. The data includes 3,840,634 observations for the 2006-2015 period. We 
eliminate firms with non-positive values of assets, liabilities, turnover or labour costs, as well 
as unreasonable values of debt to assets ratio. Moreover, sectors with a very particular 
business model were also excluded, as public administration, education, health care, 
household staff, international agencies or non-governmental organizations. Industries are 
classified according to the Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European 
Union at 3-digit level. In addition, and in line with Gal and Hijzen (2016), only firms that 
report, on average, at least 3 workers were taken into account. Therefore, our final dataset 
includes 1,287,142 observations, for a total of 183,222 firms. 
 
5.2. Variables and Descriptive Statistics  
Our main variable of interest is the total number of workers, for each firm and year. We use 
several firm-level controls in light of Gal and Hijzen (2016), including age (0-9; 10-24; 25+); 
size, a categorical variable computed by Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE)
1
; debt to 
assets ratio, with debt proxied by non-current liabilities, and the ratio grouped according to 
year-specific terciles: low debt, some debt and high debt. We use turnover per worker to 
measure labour productivity (LP), and again categorize it into year-specific terciles.  
                                                          
1
 Micro: less than 10 workers and turnover less than €2Million; Small: from 10 up to 50 workers and turnover 
from €2Million up to €10Million; Medium: from 50 up to 250 workers and turnover from €10Million up to 
€50Million; Large: 250 or more workers and turnover higher than €50Million. 
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In addition, geographic location fixed-effects are given by the Portuguese 1
st
 level 
administrative division (districts). Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of key variables 
of interest.  
Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables from IES (2006-2015) 
Variable Unit Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Turnover 10
3
€ 2,264 36,500 0 9,630,000 
Assets 10
3
€ 3,058 82,800 0 27,100,000 
Liabilities 10
3
€ 2,177 61,400 0 24,000,000 
Labour Productivity 10
3
€ 113,753 1,600,317 0 486,000 
Labour Costs per Hour € 22 1,347 0 976,286 
Debt to Assets unit 0.26 1.79 0 196.61 
Nr. Workers unit 17.4 132.571 0 23,768 
∆Employment % 0.001 0.374 -6.975 7.008 
Source: author’s own computations using the IES dataset for the 2006-2015 period. N = 1,287,142 
Figure 1 illustrates the mean of employment growth (∆Employment), in percentage, for the 
average Portuguese firm in each year. It can be noted that, on average, larger employment 
gains occurred in 2007 and larger employment losses in 2012. 
Figure 1 - Mean of Employment Growth for the Average Firm (per year, %) 
 
 





5.3. Reform Indicators  
We use the Regulatory Impact index provided by the OECD, an index of regulation in 
network sectors (energy, transport and communication) weighted by the input of those sectors 
used by each type of industry in Portugal (Regimpact PT) to measure the impact of product 
market reforms. The higher the index for a given industry, the larger the costs it bears from 
anti-competitive regulations in network sectors. Because country-specific weights can be 
endogenous, sectoral input weights for the US are also used for robustness purposes, as the 
input-output matrix in the US is closer to a situation with none or little regulation (see Rajan 
and Zingales, 1998). Yearly data, by industry, are available from 2004 until 2013. 
We proxy employment protection legislation with the Hiring and Firing Practices indicator 
(HFP) provided by the World Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum. This 
variable ranks from a minimum flexibility of 1 to a maximum of 7. Yearly data are available 
from 2006 until 2015. 
In order to estimate the impact of labour taxation, we use the OECD’s average tax wedge in 
Portugal, for a single person at 100% of average earnings without children. It consists on the 
ratio of labour taxation to total labour cost for the employer, representing additional costs 
with taxes both for employers and employees. Yearly data are available from 2000 until 2015. 
Finally, ALMP is measured by the governmental expenditure in active policies for those 
looking for a job (category 10 to 70), as a percentage of the GDP. This variable is provided by 
the OECD’s dataset on public expenditure and participant stocks on labour market 
programmes.
2







                                                          
2
 ALMP are very heterogeneous and thus proxying them with a measure such as overall spending has limitations 
(see Card et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2 - Reform Indicators            
            
                 
                    Indicator’s source: OECD                             Indicator’s source: World Economic Forum 
                            
                 
                                 Indicator’s source: OECD                                      Indicator’s source: OECD 
Note: author’s own computations. Product market regulation’s indicator is represented in this figure with no 
industry-specific weights  
 
 
6. Empirical Results and Robustness Checks 
6.1 Short-term Analysis: Impulse Response Functions  
6.1.1. Product Market Reforms 
Results show that employment losses from higher regulation of network sectors are visible 
already in the short-run (Figure 3). This is an expected result given that as networks become 
more competitive there is a reduction in their output prices and/or an increase in quality, 
which bring benefits for the all firms using networks as inputs in their production processes 
(downstream industries). Similar but larger effects can be seen in the weighted estimation, 




These results corroborate the literature who finds positive effects of deregulation of upstream 
sectors, such Gal and Hijzen (2016); Bertrand and Kramarz (2002) and Viviano (2008). 
Moreover, the impact on employment from regulation of network sectors is still negative and 
significant when, for purposes of robustness, the regulatory impact indicator using weights for 
Portugal is replaced by the one using US weights.  
 
Figure 3 - Cumulative Impact of Product Market Regulation (%) 
 
      Non-weighted estimation                                                  Weighted estimation 
Source: author’s own computations 
 
6.1.2. Labour Market Reforms 
According with the presented estimates, less stringent dismissal legislation is associated with 
employment losses, at least in the short-term (Figure 4). The intuition is that firms tend to 
initially dismiss workers and only after start to hire, in particular during periods of crisis.
3
 In 
any case, by comparing the weighted and non-weighted results, one can see that firms with 
more workers face relatively lower employment losses. Overall, our results are in line with 
the findings of Messina and Vallanti (2007) and Von Below and Thoursie (2010). 
 
 
                                                          
3 However, what can be seen as a loss in terms of employment does not necessarily mean a loss in terms of 
labour market efficiency, given that a firm that faces better firing conditions may dismiss two employees with 
low productivity while hiring another who is more productive However, the results in Gouveia, Santos and 
Gonçalves (2017) show that a more flexible labour market is detrimental to total factor productivity, except for 





































Figure 4 - Cumulative Impact of Easing Firing and Hiring Practices (%) 
 
      Non-weighted estimation                                                  Weighted estimation 
Source: author’s own computations 
Looking now at the tax wedge prevailing in Portugal for the average wage (single earner 
without children), our results are in line with economic theory predictions and with most 
existing empirical literature. Increasing labour taxation as a percentage of employers’ labour 
costs reduces employment growth, at least in the short-term (Figure 5). This is especially 
relevant in a context of sticky wages, when a high tax wedge is synonym of high costs both 
for the employer (demand side) and employee (supply side), then reducing employment 
incentives. Results are similar in the weighted and non-weighted estimation. 
Figure 5 - Cumulative Impact of Tax Wedge (%) 
 
      Non-weighted estimation                                                  Weighted estimation 













































































Finally, spending in active labour market polices is found to be effective in increasing 
employment. Indeed, and in line with Lechner et al. (2004), employment effects are positive 
in the short-term and increasing with time, both for the average firm and for firms with more 
workers (Figure 6).  
Figure 6 - Cumulative Impact of Active Labour Market Policies (%) 
 
      Non-weighted estimation                                                  Weighted estimation 
Source: author’s own computations 
 
Table 2 - Impact of Reforms on the Contemporaneous Employment Change 
 
  Panel OLS Weighted Panel OLS  
Variable  





















































































































Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Geographic Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes  
      Legend: *p-value <0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01           Source: author’s own computations 
For further robustness, the same model was re-estimated using paid employees instead of the 
total number of workers and results did not change. The same was done without taking into 
account micro firms, but again with no significant changes for purposes of policy evaluation.  
 
6.2. Using Policy Variations as Quasi-Experiments 
Natural Hiring and Dismissal Rates   
Given the lack of consensus in the literature concerning employment effects of labor 
liberalization, we complement our analysis with a difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation 
(following [2]), in order to address causal inference in a more robust way, without possible 
problems of reverse-causality or omitted variable bias. By comparing employment 
developments of two groups of firms – one more exposed to labour market regulation than the 
other – we assess the impact of the largest change in hiring and firing practices during the 
period considered in our analysis (Figure 2). 
As explored by Micco and Pagés (2006) and Bassanini et al. (2009), industries where layoff 
rates are higher (used as proxies for higher job turnover rates) are more likely to be affected 
by changes in employment protection legislation (EPL). Therefore, using sectoral data on US 
layoff rates computed by Bassanini et al. (2009) from 2001 to 2003, we have an exogenous 
indicator of EPL “bindness” for a given sector in a liberalized market (US), providing us with 
a measure of natural layoff propensity. Therefore, following Bassanini et al. (2009), firms 
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within industries whose average US layoff rate is above the median of US layoff rates for all 
industries are considered EPL-binding (treatment group) and the ones whose average US 
layoff rate is below this threshold are not (control group).
4
  
In addition, and to properly identify the post-reform period, we find that laws introducing 
reductions in severance payments and making fair dismissals easier, entered into force in  late 
2011/early 2012 (Law 53/2011 of 14 October 2011, Law 3/2012 of 10 January 2012 and 3
rd
 
amendment to Labour Code no.23/2012, of 25 June 2012). Thus, the post-reform period 
considered is captured by the dummy “Reform” taking the value 1 from 2012 onwards. 
 
                 Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics                           Table 4 - Difference in Differences Estimation Results                                     
 
 
Legend: *p-value <0.1; **p-value <0.05; ***p-value <0.01                             Source: author’s own computations 
 
 
Table 3 show the means of some key variables and respective test of equality of means 
between control and treatment groups. To account for large differences between groups, the 
                                                          
4
 Sectors in the treatment group: textiles and leather, products of wood and cork; refined petroleum products; 
rubber and plastics; fabricated metal products; basic metals; other non-metallic products; machinery n.e.c.; 
manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling; precision and optimal equipment; transport and storage; transport equipment; 
construction;  post and telecommunications; electrical machinery and apparatus. 
 
Sectors in the control group: food products and beverages, paper, printing and publishing; chemicals and 
chemical products; electricity, gas and water supply; wholesale trade; hotels and restaurants; retail trade 
(including motor trade). 
 Variable Treatment Control t 
Turnover 1,953,136 2,524,546 5.91 
Labour 
Productivity 
72,570 117,401 14.50 
Labour Costs Per 
Hour 
24.2 19.6 -1.40 
Debt to Assets 0.21 0.34 31.95 
Mean US Layoff 
Rates (2001-2003) 
5.69 3.32 -1.9e+03 
Employment 18.72 15.22 -11.83 




















variables size, labour productivity and debt to assets are used as controls in the baseline 
regression [2]. Figure 7 presents the evolution of employment for the two groups and the 
break point being considered (2012).  
Table 4 presents the results from the DiD estimation. We show that, as expected, the reform 
has no impact for the control group. For firms within sectors with higher layoff propensity, 
we find evidence of significant net job destruction after the implementation of reforms 
making employment protection legislation less stringent, which corroborates the results 
presented in Section 6.1. 
Figure 7 - Mean of Employment (employees) 
  
Source: author’s own calculations.  
Note: This graph was produced using Binscatter command in STATA.  
 
Finally, we use other reform dummies as a placebo experiment (for example, assuming that 
our post-reform period begins in 2008 instead of 2012), finding no significant results. 
 
7. Conclusion 
During the last decade, Portugal has implemented a set of structural reforms in several areas. 
Understanding the short-term impact of these reforms is crucial for policy makers to design 
the optimal reform mix. Additionally, short-term effects are key for the ownership of the 




Using firm-level data for Portugal, from 2006 to 2015, and relying on reform indicators 
provided by supranational institutions as OECD and the World Economic Forum, we 
conclude that product market reforms, aiming to decrease the level of regulation and entry 
barriers in network sectors, have a positive effect on firm-level employment in the years 
following the reform, given that many firms benefit from increased competition in upstream 
sectors. We also find that increasing labour market flexibility through easier hirings and firing 
practices has a negative impact on employment, at least during the short-term. In addition, 
reducing labour taxation and increasing public expenditure in active labour market policies 
are found to be effective in the short-term.  
Going forward, we are extending our work to understand heterogeneous effects across firms, 
including also longer-term effects. This will allow us to better identify gainers and losers and 
thus to better inform policy makers.  
Moreover, the results are informative on the impact on the quantity of employment, but are 
silent on the quality of employment, which is key for assessing equity considerations. Future 
research, based on worker-level datasets should aim at shedding light on these topics. In 
addition, it should be noted that the effects of labour market regulation reforms are assessed in 
our setting based on firm-level data, which provide us with net employment levels but not 
with churn rates. This is an important element to understand labour market dynamics but 
could only be incorporated using worker-level datasets. On measures of active labour market 
policies, our indicator is overall spending. However, given that ALMP include many 
heterogeneous policies, generalizations of our results need to be done with care. In particular, 
efficiency consideration should be taken into account through a cost-benefit analysis, which 
would help measuring the impact of public investment in this area.  
Finally, and in line with the literature, the effect of the cycle should be taken into account. For 
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